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ABSTRACT
In Padilla v. Kentucky, the Supreme Court held that, under the Sixth Amend-
ment, counsel is required to advise a noncitizen of the possibility of deportation in
the event of a criminal conviction in order for the representation to be constitution-
ally valid. In cases where the immigration consequences of a plea or conviction are
clear and succinct, an attorney is required to discuss those consequences with the
client. However, in cases where those consequences are less certain, an attorney is
only required to advise the client regarding the possibility of such consequences.
This Article discusses what happens when the immigration consequences are too
complicated for a criminal attorney to ascertain but the client is indigent and cannot
afford to hire an immigration attorney.
* Trial Attorney, United States Department of Justice. Special thanks to Rob Snyder and
Jackie Brown for all of their help along the way. The views expressed in this Article are
those of the author and are not necessarily the views of the Department of Justice.
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I. INTRODUCTION
At the time of his arrest for drug trafficking, Jose Padilla, a Honduras
native, had been a lawful permanent resident of the United States for more than
forty years and had served in the United States military during the Vietnam
War.1 Unbeknownst to Padilla, the crime with which he was charged required
automatic deportation upon conviction.2 Not only did Padilla’s attorney fail to
alert Padilla to this fact, the attorney also told him that he “did not have to
worry about immigration status since he had been in the country so long.”3
Based upon his attorney’s erroneous advice, Padilla pleaded guilty to the
charges against him.4 Padilla later claimed that he would not have pleaded
guilty had his attorney given him the correct advice.5
On appeal to the Supreme Court of Kentucky, Padilla argued that his
guilty plea was the result of ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland
v. Washington,6 and that he was therefore deprived of his Sixth Amendment
right to counsel.7 That court denied Padilla any relief, finding “that the Sixth
Amendment’s guarantee of effective assistance of counsel does not protect a
criminal defendant from erroneous advice about deportation because it is
merely a ‘collateral’ consequence of his conviction.”8 The Supreme Court of
the United States granted certiorari to decide whether Padilla’s counsel was
obligated to notify him that, if he pleaded guilty, he would be removed from the
country.9 The Court ultimately held that the Sixth Amendment does require this
notification.10
Although the Court did not address it, one interesting question that has
emerged post-Padilla is whether the law requires that indigent noncitizen crim-
inal defendants also be appointed an immigration attorney in cases where the
immigration consequences of a plea or conviction are too complicated for a
criminal attorney to determine. This Article argues that federal statutory law,
the Sixth Amendment, and the Due Process Clause all require that such a
defendant be appointed an immigration attorney in certain circumstances.11
1 Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1477 (2010).
2 Id. (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i)).
3 Id. at 1478.
4 Id.
5 Id.
6 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
7 Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1478.
8 Id.
9 Id.
10 Id.
11 This Article does not address the related but separate issue of whether the Due Process
Clause requires the appointment of counsel for an alien in an immigration proceeding, an
issue that has spawned several worth-while law review articles. See generally Beth J. Wer-
lin, Renewing the Call: Immigrants’ Right to Appointed Counsel in Deportation Proceed-
ings, 20 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 393 (2000); Note, A Second Chance: The Right to Effective
Assistance of Counsel in Immigration Removal Proceedings, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1544
(2006–07). Although this is an interesting constitutional question, it is beyond the scope of
this Article which focuses specifically on whether an indigent non-citizen criminal defen-
dant has the right, under the Sixth Amendment or the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, to be appointed immigration counsel for the purpose of advising the defendant
of the immigration consequences of a plea or conviction.
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Section II of this Article will review the history of the Supreme Court’s
Sixth Amendment and Due Process jurisprudence, focusing particularly on the
area of indigent representation. Section II.B will examine Strickland and its
progeny and what is required for representation to be constitutionally effective.
Section II.C will discuss the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
as it applies to indigent defendants. Section III will provide a detailed discus-
sion of the Supreme Court’s opinion in Padilla. Finally, Section IV will discuss
how all of these precedents might apply in the context of a noncitizen indigent
defendant facing the possibility of deportation upon conviction, and will
examine federal statutory law in this context.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Sixth Amendment and Indigent Representation
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides: “In all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the Assis-
tance of Counsel for his defence.”12
The Supreme Court first recognized a constitutional right to the assistance
of appointed counsel for indigent defendants in Powell v. Alabama.13 Powell
dealt with the trial of “The Scottsboro Boys,” a group of nine African American
teenagers who were charged with the rape of two Caucasian women on a
freight train traveling from Chattanooga to Memphis, Tennessee, in March
1931.14 The defendants in Powell were all indigent, and, therefore, could not
afford attorneys.15 Immediately prior to trial, but after the trial judge had called
the case, an out-of-town lawyer informed the judge that, although he had not
been retained by the defendants, he had spoken to some interested parties about
the case, and that he wanted “to appear along with counsel that the court might
appoint.”16 The judge informed the inquiring attorney that the court would not
appoint counsel if he would appear on behalf of the defendants, but would
allow him to have co-counsel if any other attorney wanted to help represent the
defendants.17 After the attorney asked the judge if counsel had already been
appointed, the judge stated that he had “appointed all the members of the bar
for the purpose of arraigning the defendants and then of course [he] anticipated
them to continue to help [the defendants] if no counsel appear[ed].”18
After the out-of-town attorney informed the judge that he did not wish to
appear as sole counsel for the defendants, the judge asked all the lawyers pre-
sent whether any were willing to assist.19 When one of the attorneys present
12 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
13 Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
14 Douglas O. Linder, “The Scottsboro Boys” Trials, FAMOUS AM. TRIALS, http://
www.law.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/scottsboro/scottsb.htm (last visited Jan. 6, 2012);
see also DAN T. CARTER, SCOTTSBORO: A TRAGEDY OF THE AMERICAN SOUTH (rev. ed.
1979).
15 Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 44 (1972) (Burger, C.J., concurring) (noting that
defendants in Powell were indigent).
16 Powell, 287 U.S. at 53.
17 Id.
18 Id.
19 Id. at 54.
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answered that he would assist the out-of-town attorney in any way he could, the
judge proceeded with the trials.20 After three separate trials, each of which the
court completed within a single day, the defendants were all found guilty and
sentenced to death.21 The Alabama Supreme Court affirmed the convictions
and sentences.22
The United States Supreme Court reversed, concluding that the “action of
the trial judge in respect of appointment of counsel was little more than an
expensive gesture, imposing no substantial or definite obligation upon any
one.”23 The Court illustrated the defendants’ plight:
[F]rom the time of their arraignment until the beginning of their trial, when consulta-
tion, thorough-going investigation and preparation were vitally important, the
defendants did not have the aid of counsel in any real sense, although they were as
much entitled to such aid during that period as at the trial itself.
. . . .
The defendants, young, ignorant, illiterate, surrounded by hostile sentiment,
haled back and forth under guard of soldiers, charged with an atrocious crime
regarded with especial horror in the community where they were to be tried, were
thus put in peril of their lives within a few moments after counsel for the first time
charged with any degree of responsibility began to represent them.24
Based on these findings, the Court concluded that the defendants had not
been granted effective assistance of counsel.25 However, the Court did not
focus on the Sixth Amendment right to counsel—at that time, the Sixth
Amendment applied only to federal prosecutions—but instead focused exclu-
sively on the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.26 The Court
did, however, allude to the Sixth Amendment right to counsel:
It is possible that some of the personal rights . . . may also be safeguarded against
state action . . . not because those rights are enumerated in the first eight Amend-
ments, but because they are of such a nature that they are included in the conception
of due process of law.27
The Court concluded that the right to counsel is fundamental and is there-
fore guaranteed by the Due Process Clause.28 Despite being a landmark case,
Powell’s holding was limited—the court restrained the right to counsel to the
narrow facts of the case instead of creating a rule that would apply broadly.29
20 Id. at 56.
21 Id. at 50.
22 Id.
23 Id. at 56.
24 Id. at 57–58.
25 Id. at 58.
26 Id. at 60.
27 Id. at 67 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
28 Id. at 68. The court explained that:
The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did not comprehend the right to
be heard by counsel. Even the intelligent and educated layman has small and sometimes no skill
in the science of law. . . . If that be true of men of intelligence, how much more true is it of the
ignorant and illiterate, or those of feeble intellect.
Id. at 68–69.
29 [U]nder the circumstances just stated, the necessity of counsel was so vital and imperative that
the failure of the trial court to make an effective appointment of counsel was likewise a denial of
due process within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. Whether this would be so in
368 NEVADA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 12:364
Therefore, after Powell, indigent defendants were entitled to appointed counsel
only where they were being charged with a capital crime and where they were
incapable of representing themselves because of ignorance, feeble mindedness,
or illiteracy.30
Approximately six years later, in Johnson v. Zerbst,31 the Supreme Court
held that, in all federal felony cases, the Sixth Amendment requires that indi-
gent defendants be appointed counsel.32 The defendant in Johnson was arrested
and charged in federal court with uttering33 and passing several counterfeit
Federal Reserve notes.34 Johnson was from out of town; he did not have rela-
tives, friends, or acquaintances nearby; he had little education; and he was pen-
niless.35 Because he could not post bail, Johnson was held in jail until he was
indicted.36 Two days after he was indicted, he was brought to court, given his
first notice of the indictment, and was immediately arraigned, tried, convicted,
and sentenced to four-and-a-half years in prison.37 Although Johnson was rep-
resented by counsel at his preliminary hearing where he was bound over for
indictment, he was not provided counsel at any subsequent stage of the pro-
ceedings.38 Johnson filed a habeas petition with the district court, which it
denied.39
The Supreme Court held that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel was a
fundamental safeguard necessary to insure life and liberty.40 The Court
observed that this protection recognizes the reality that the average defendant
cannot competently protect himself in court.41 It also recognized that, although
attorneys may easily understand legal procedure and arguments, to the
other criminal prosecutions, or under other circumstances, we need not determine. All that is
necessary now to decide, as we do decide, is that in a capital case, where the defendant is unable
to employ counsel, and is incapable adequately of making his own defense because of ignorance,
feeble-mindedness, illiteracy, or the like, it is the duty of the court, whether requested or not, to
assign counsel for him as a necessary requisite of due process of law . . . .
Id. at 71.
30 Id. Justice Pierce Butler, joined by Justice James Clark McReynolds, dissented from the
majority’s opinion in Powell. Although Justice Butler agreed with the majority that if peti-
tioners had been denied the right of counsel, they would have been denied due process and
entitled to relief, he disagreed with the majority’s finding that the petitioners were, in fact,
denied the right to counsel. Id. at 73–74 (Butler, J., dissenting). In Justice Butler’s opinion,
the representation afforded the petitioners was more than sufficient. Id. at 74–75.
31 Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
32 JEROLD H. ISRAEL & WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: CONSTITUTIONAL LIMI-
TATIONS IN A NUTSHELL 345 (Thompson/West, 7th ed. 2006); see also Victor L. Streib,
Would You Lie to Save Your Client’s Life? Ethics and Effectiveness in Defending Against
Death, 42 BRANDEIS L.J. 405, 411–12 (2003–04) (discussing Powell and Johnson).
33
“[U]ttering” is “[t]he crime of presenting a false or worthless instrument with the intent to
harm or defraud.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1582 (8th ed. 2004) (emphasis omitted).
34 Johnson, 304 U.S. at 459–60.
35 Id. at 460.
36 Id.
37 Id.
38 Id.
39 Id. at 458–59.
40 Id. at 462. “The Sixth Amendment withholds from federal courts, in all criminal proceed-
ings, the power and authority to deprive an accused of his life or liberty unless he has or
waives the assistance of counsel.” Id. at 463 (footnote omitted).
41 Id. at 462–63.
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untrained layman the entire situation could be bewildering.42 Moreover, the
Court rejected the suggestion that an indigent defendant must assert his right to
counsel before he is afforded such right; it noted that the Sixth Amendment’s
guarantee would be nullified if a court could deny a defendant’s constitutional
rights simply because of his ignorance.43 Turning to the facts of the case before
it, the Court concluded that Johnson “was convicted without enjoying the assis-
tance of counsel” and reversed the district court’s denial of Johnson’s habeas
petition.44
However, four years later in Betts v. Brady,45 the Supreme Court declined
to extend the Johnson holding to state prosecutions via the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.46 There, the defendant, Betts, was indicted for robbery in a Maryland
state court.47 Betts, who was indigent, requested court-appointed counsel.48
The judge denied this request and informed the defendant that counsel was only
appointed in rape and murder cases.49 Betts pleaded not guilty and the case
proceeded to a bench trial.50 Betts subpoenaed and called his own witnesses
and cross-examined prosecution witnesses.51 He had the opportunity to testify
himself, but declined.52 The judge found Betts guilty and sentenced him to
eight years in prison.53 Betts filed a habeas motion with the Maryland Court of
Appeals and claimed that he had been denied the right to counsel in violation of
the Fourteenth Amendment.54 The court of appeals granted the writ, but denied
Betts any relief.55
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and addressed
whether Betts had been denied his due process rights when the court refused to
appoint counsel.56 First, however, the Supreme Court rejected Betts’s argument
that the entire Sixth Amendment should be incorporated against the states, find-
ing that it applied only to trials in federal court—but that in some situations a
state’s denial of a right outlined in the first eight amendments might be an
unconstitutional denial of due process.57 However, the court was unable to
42 Id. at 463.
43 Id. at 464–65.
44 Id. at 469. As in Powell, Justices Butler and McReynolds dissented. Justice Butler
believed that Johnson had waived his right to counsel. Id.
45 Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
46 ISRAEL & LAFAVE, supra note 32, at 345; see also Gabriel J. Chin & Scott C. Wells, Can
a Reasonable Doubt Have an Unreasonable Price? Limitations on Attorneys’ Fees in Crimi-
nal Cases, 41 B.C. L. REV. 1, 58 n.275 (1999) (discussing Powell, Johnson, and Betts).
47 Betts, 316 U.S. at 456.
48 Id. at 456–57.
49 Id. at 457.
50 Id.
51 Id.
52 Id.
53 Id.
54 Id.
55 Id.
56 Id. at 457, 461.
57 Id. at 461–462.
The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not incorporate, as such, the specific
guarantees found in the Sixth Amendment although a denial by a state of rights or privileges
specifically embodied in that and others of the first eight amendments may, in certain circum-
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accept the argument that the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process “obligates
the states . . . to furnish counsel in every such case.”58
The Court in Betts distinguished the case before it from Powell by noting
that the petitioners in Powell were young, unknown in the community, and had
neither connections nor the means to obtain an attorney; furthermore, although
state law required that the defendants be represented, the trial court in Powell
casually appointed counsel at the last minute, when it was too late to ade-
quately consult or prepare.59 In contrast, Betts was forty-three and capable of
taking care of his own interests.60 The Court also noted that because Betts’s
defense to the charges against him was that he was not present at the crime and
that he had an alibi, the issue was simply the truth of the testimony.61 The
Court found that, under Maryland law, if Betts had been at a serious disadvan-
tage because he lacked counsel, the court’s refusal to appoint an attorney would
have mandated a reversal of judgment.62 The Court ultimately rejected Betts’s
contention that he was denied due process and affirmed the state court.63
Justice Black’s dissent, joined by Justices Douglas and Murphy, stated that
the Fourteenth Amendment made the Sixth Amendment—including its guaran-
tee of appointed counsel in all felony cases—applicable to the states.64 The
dissent argued that this right in criminal proceedings is a fundamental one and
that denying indigents counsel in cases involving serious crimes has long been
seen as a shocking injustice.65
This sentiment eventually became law. Twenty-one years later, in Gideon
v. Wainwright,66 the Supreme Court adopted this reasoning, overruled Betts,
and incorporated the Sixth Amendment against the states.67 Clarence Earl
Gideon was charged with felony theft after he broke into a poolroom.68
stances, or in connection with other elements, operate, in a given case, to deprive a litigant of due
process of law in violation of the Fourteenth.
Id. (footnote omitted).
58 Id. at 471. Moreover,
the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the conviction and incarceration of one whose trial is offen-
sive to the common and fundamental ideas of fairness and right, and while want of counsel in a
particular case may result in a conviction lacking in such fundamental fairness, we cannot say
that the amendment embodies an inexorable command that no trial for any offense, or in any
court, can be fairly conducted and justice accorded a defendant who is not represented by
counsel.
Id. at 473.
59 Id. at 463.
60 Id. at 472.
61 Id.
62 Id. at 472–73.
63 Id. at 473.
64 Id. at 474 (Black, J., dissenting); see also Akhil Reed Amar, 2000 Daniel J. Meador
Lecture: Hugo Black and the Hall of Fame, 53 ALA. L. REV. 1221, 1240–41 (2002) (discuss-
ing Justice Black’s argument for incorporation in Betts).
65 Betts, 316 U.S. at 475–76.
66 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 345 (1963).
67 See Amar, supra note 64, at 1241. For another in-depth discussion of Gideon, see Con-
ference on the 30th Anniversary of the United States Supreme Court’s Decision in Gideon v.
Wainwright: Gideon and the Public Service Role of Lawyers in Advancing Equal Justice, 43
AM. U. L. REV. 1 (1993).
68 Gideon, 372 U.S. at 336.
Spring 2012] I WANT MY (IMMIGRATION) LAWYER! 371
Because Gideon was indigent, he asked the court for an appointed lawyer.69
The trial judge refused Gideon’s request based on a Florida law that provided
for appointment of counsel only in capital cases.70 After representing himself at
trial, Gideon was found guilty and sentenced to five years in prison.71 On
appeal to the Florida Supreme Court, Gideon argued that the trial court’s
refusal to appoint counsel denied him his constitutional rights.72 The Florida
Supreme Court denied Gideon all relief.73
After granting certiorari,74 the United States Supreme Court, in an opinion
authored by Justice Black, applied the doctrine of selective incorporation and
held “that a provision of the Bill of Rights which is ‘fundamental and essential
to a fair trial’ is made obligatory upon the States by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.”75 The Court then expressly overruled Betts and concluded that the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel was of such a fundamental nature that it was
incorporated against the states via the Fourteenth Amendment.76 The Gideon
Court cited Powell and found that, even though the Court in Powell limited its
holding to the facts before it, it still undeniably concluded that the right to
counsel is a fundamental one.77 Based on this reasoning, the Court determined
that Betts was contrary to the Court’s precedent and was incorrectly and
unwisely decided.78
Several concurring opinions were filed in Gideon. Justice Douglas con-
curred in the judgment, but advocated total incorporation, under which all of
the rights granted by the Bill of Rights would be incorporated against the states
via the Fourteenth Amendment.79 Justice Clark, joined by Justice Harlan, also
concurred in the judgment, but wrote separately to express his belief that the
majority’s holding simply erased the distinction between capital offenses and
non-capital offenses, a distinction which, in Justice Clark’s view, was illogical
from the beginning.80 Justice Harlan filed a separate concurrence in which he
agreed with the majority that Betts should be overruled but felt the Court
69 Id. at 337.
70 Id.
71 Id.
72 Id.
73 Id.
74 Although Gideon was denied counsel at trial, Abe Fortas, who two years later would
become a Justice on the Supreme Court, was appointed to represent him before the Court.
See Abe Fortas, THE OYEZ PROJECT, http://oyez.org/justices/abe_fortas (last visited Jan. 6,
2012).
75 Gideon, 372 U.S. at 342.
76 Id. at 345.
77 Id. at 343.
78 Id. at 343–45. The Court reasoned that:
In returning to these old precedents, sounder we believe than the new, we but restore constitu-
tional principles established to achieve a fair system of justice. Not only these precedents but
also reason and reflection require us to recognize that in our adversary system of criminal justice,
any person hauled into court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial
unless counsel is provided for him. This seems to us to be an obvious truth.
Id. at 344.
79 Id. at 345–46 (Douglas, J., concurring). For a discussion on incorporation and the Four-
teenth Amendment, see Virginia V. Moore & Morris B. Hoffman, The Court Says No to
“Incorporation Rebound”, 61 BAYLOR L. REV. 818, 831–33 (2009).
80 Gideon, 372 U.S. at 348 (Clark, J., concurring).
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should have taken a more respectful approach.81 Justice Harlan disagreed that
Betts had been clearly contrary to the Court’s precedent.”82
Since Gideon, courts have extended the right to appointed counsel83 to all
stages of criminal proceedings where the lack of counsel may affect a substan-
tial right.84 These critical stages include identification lineups,85 interroga-
tions,86 arraignments and initial appearances where the state requires the
defendant to make an election that could be prejudicial,87 preliminary hear-
ings,88 trials,89 and sentencings.90 The Sixth Amendment right to counsel is not
automatically satisfied, however, when an indigent defendant is provided an
attorney. Instead, the Supreme Court has made it clear that the Sixth Amend-
ment does more than simply establish the right to legal representation—it
requires that the representation a criminal defendant receives is competent and
effective.
B. Strickland and the Standard for Effectiveness
In Strickland v. Washington,91 decided twenty-one years after Gideon, the
Supreme Court established the test for determining whether an attorney’s per-
formance was so ineffective as to deprive the defendant of his Sixth Amend-
ment right to counsel.92 After a violent ten-day crime spree, the defendant in
Strickland was arrested and indicted in state court for kidnapping and murder.93
He was appointed an experienced criminal lawyer, who at first actively
defended the case, but abruptly stopped when the defendant confessed to the
first two murders, against the attorney’s advice.94 The attorney became further
discouraged when—again against his advice—the defendant pleaded guilty to
all charges and waived his right under Florida law to an advisory jury at his
sentencing hearing.95
The attorney prepared for sentencing only by speaking with the defendant
and the defendant’s wife and mother about the defendant’s background.96
Besides this, however, the attorney did not gather character witnesses for the
81 Id. at 349 (Harlan, J., concurring).
82 Id.
83 For a discussion of post-Gideon decisions, see Emily Garcia Uhrig, A Case for a Consti-
tutional Right in Habeas Corpus, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 541, 557–59 (2009).
84 Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128, 134 (1967).
85 United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 236–37 (1967).
86 Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 490–91 (1964).
87 Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52, 54–55 (1961); White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59, 60
(1963).
88 Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 9–10 (1970).
89 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 345 (1963).
90 Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128, 137 (1967).
91 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
92 ISRAEL & LAFAVE, supra note 32, at 394. For a comprehensive analysis of Strickland, see
David J. Gross, Sixth Amendment—Defendant’s Dual Burden in Claims of Ineffective Assis-
tance of Counsel, 75 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 755 (1984).
93 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 671–72.
94 Id. at 672.
95 Id.
96 Id. at 672–73.
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defendant.97 Additionally, because the attorney did not have reason to believe
the defendant had psychological problems, he failed to request a psychiatric
examination.98 The attorney also did not present other evidence he thought was
potentially damaging, such as the defendant’s rap sheet.99 Instead, the attorney
focused on the defendant’s remorse and acceptance of responsibility because
the judge had remarked that he found those factors to be important.100 The
attorney also pointed out that the defendant did not have a criminal history, that
he was under severe mental and emotional stress when he committed these
crimes, and that he had not only surrendered and confessed, but he had also
volunteered to testify against a codefendant.101 The defense attorney argued
that these factors justified a lesser sentence than the death penalty.102 However,
the attorney did not cross-examine the medical experts that were called by the
prosecution to testify regarding the victims’ manner of death.103
After articulating several aggravating circumstances, including a finding
that the defendant was fully aware of the criminal nature of his acts and “was
not suffering from extreme mental or emotional disturbance,”104 the trial judge
sentenced the defendant to death.105 On direct appeal, the Florida Supreme
Court upheld the defendant’s convictions and sentences.106 In a subsequent col-
lateral proceeding, the defendant claimed that his attorney had given ineffective
assistance because of his failure to move for a continuance in order to gain time
to adequately prepare for the sentencing, his failure to order a psychiatric
report, his failure to get a presentence investigation report, his failure to obtain
favorable character witnesses, his failure to investigate or challenge the medical
evidence, and his failure to present relevant and compelling arguments.107 The
defendant presented fourteen affidavits from friends, neighbors, and relatives
who would have testified had counsel requested it.108 He also submitted both a
psychiatric report and a psychological report that stated that at the time of the
97 Id. at 673.
98 Id. According to the Court:
Counsel decided not to present and hence not to look further for evidence concerning [the defen-
dant’s] character and emotional state. That decision reflected trial counsel’s sense of hopeless-
ness about overcoming the evidentiary effect of [the defendant’s] confessions to the gruesome
crimes. It also reflected the judgment that it was advisable to rely on the plea colloquy for
evidence about [the defendant’s] background and about his claim of emotional distress: the plea
colloquy communicated sufficient information about these subjects, and by forgoing the opportu-
nity to present new evidence on these subjects, counsel prevented the State from cross-examining
[the defendant] on his claim and from putting on psychiatric evidence of its own.
Id. (citations omitted).
99 Id.
100 Id.
101 Id. at 673–74.
102 Id. at 673.
103 Id. at 674.
104 Id.
105 Id. at 675.
106 Id.
107 Id.
108 Id.
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crimes, he was “chronically frustrated and depressed because of his economic
dilemma.”109
Notwithstanding this evidence, the state trial court denied the defendant’s
request for collateral relief, relying on the standard that had been established by
the Florida Supreme Court several years prior.110 The trial court concluded that
the defendant had failed to show that his attorney had been incompetent, or that
the attorney’s decisions had likely affected the outcome.111 The Florida
Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s denial of relief, noting that the defen-
dant’s failure to make his case was so substantial that it was certain he was not
entitled to relief.112
The defendant then turned to federal court and filed a habeas petition.113
After an evidentiary hearing, the district court denied any relief, concluding
that “although trial counsel made errors . . . no prejudice to respondent’s sen-
tence resulted from any such error in judgment.”114 En banc, the Eleventh Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court under a new test it developed
for analyzing ineffective assistance claims.115 The Eleventh Circuit held that
the Sixth Amendment gave criminal defendants a right to an attorney who
could render effective assistance and who did reasonably do so in light of all of
the circumstances.116 The United States Supreme Court, in order to clarify the
standard used to determine ineffective assistance of counsel, granted
certiorari.117
The Court began its discussion by noting that previous cases, including
Powell, Johnson, and Gideon, supported the proposition that the Sixth Amend-
ment, through the right to effective counsel, directly protects the fundamental
right to a fair trial.118 However, the Court further held that the mere presence of
an attorney does not satisfy the test; the attorney must be competent to fairly
represent the defendant so that the court may render a just decision.119
The Court established a two-part test to be utilized in determining whether
representation was constitutionally deficient:
First, the defendant must show that counsel’s performance was deficient. This
requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not function-
ing as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the
defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. This
requires showing that counsel’s errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of
a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.120
109 Id. at 675–76 (internal quotation marks omitted).
110 Id. at 676–77.
111 Id. at 677.
112 Id. at 678.
113 Id.
114 Id. at 678–79.
115 Id. at 679.
116 Id. at 680.
117 Id. at 684.
118 Id.
119 Id. at 685.
120 Id. at 687. “Unless a defendant makes both showings, it cannot be said that the convic-
tion or death sentence resulted from a breakdown in the adversary process that renders the
result unreliable.” Id.
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After discussing its newly-developed standard in more detail, the Court
turned to the facts of the case before it and concluded that the defendant had
not established ineffective assistance of counsel because the attorney’s choices
were reasonably strategic under the circumstances, and the evidence against the
defendant was so overwhelming that it was unlikely that any alternative the
attorney might have pursued would have made any difference.121 Accordingly,
the Court reversed the Eleventh Circuit and affirmed the district court’s denial
of habeas relief.122
Since establishing the test for ineffectiveness in Strickland, the Supreme
Court has decided numerous cases in which it has applied that test to specific
circumstances. In Nix v. Whiteside, for example, the Court held that the Sixth
Amendment right of a criminal defendant to assistance of counsel was not vio-
lated by an attorney refusing to cooperate with the defendant in presenting per-
jured testimony at trial.123 All nine Justices in Nix agreed that the defendant
failed to meet the prejudice prong of the Strickland test, and five Justices held
that the defendant failed to meet the incompetency prong.124 Likewise, in Yar-
borough v. Gentry, the Court rejected the defendant’s assertion that his attor-
ney’s closing argument rendered his representation ineffective under
Strickland.125 In a unanimous decision, the Court noted that attorneys must be
allowed flexibility in their decisions of how to best represent a client, especially
during closing arguments, given the many strategies that may appear reasona-
ble at the time.126
121 Id. at 698–700. Under the first prong of the test, the Court found:
[T]he record shows that respondent’s counsel made a strategic choice to argue for the extreme
emotional distress mitigating circumstance and to rely as fully as possible on respondent’s
acceptance of responsibility for his crimes. . . . Counsel’s strategy choice was well within the
range of professionally reasonable judgments, and the decision not to seek more character or
psychological evidence than was already in hand was likewise reasonable.
Id. at 699. Under the second prong, the Court determined:
[T]he lack of merit of respondent’s claim is even more stark. The evidence that respondent says
his trial counsel should have offered at the sentencing hearing would barely have altered the
sentencing profile presented to the sentencing judge. . . . Given the overwhelming aggravating
factors, there is no reasonable probability that the omitted evidence would have changed the
conclusion that the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating circumstances and,
hence, the sentence imposed.
Id. at 699–700.
122 Id. at 701. Justice Brennan concurred in the majority’s reasoning but dissented from the
majority’s judgment based on his belief that the death penalty was cruel and unusual punish-
ment under the Eighth Amendment. Id. (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). Justice Marshall filed a separate dissent, in which he criticized the majority’s efforts to
clarify effectiveness standards as being “unhelpful.” Id. at 706–07 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
123 Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 176 (1986).
124 ISRAEL & LAFAVE, supra note 32, at 400.
125 Yarborough v. Gentry, 540 U.S. 1, 5–6 (2003).
126 Id.
Closing arguments should sharpen and clarify the issues for resolution by the trier of fact, but
which issues to sharpen and how best to clarify them are questions with many reasonable
answers. Indeed, it might sometimes make sense to forgo closing argument altogether. Judicial
review of a defense attorney’s summation is therefore highly deferential—and doubly deferential
when it is conducted through the lens of federal habeas.
Id. at 6 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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The Court also applied the Strickland test in Kimmelman v. Morrison.127
There, the defendant claimed that counsel failed to timely file a motion to sup-
press evidence that was found during an unconstitutional search.128 The attor-
ney attempted to justify his failure by arguing that he was unaware of the
seizure in question until after trial had already begun.129 As to Strickland’s
performance prong, the Court held that although “the failure to file a suppres-
sion motion does not constitute per se ineffective assistance of counsel,”130
counsel in Kimmelman was ineffective because the attorney’s failure to file a
timely suppression motion was not a strategic decision, but was instead due to
his lack of knowledge of the search, which was a direct result of his failure to
conduct pretrial discovery.131 The Court concluded that the record before it
was incomplete and remanded the case to the district court for an evidentiary
hearing regarding prejudice.132
The Sixth Amendment is not the only constitutional provision that poten-
tially impacts indigent criminal defendants. Because the Sixth Amendment
deals only with the right to legal counsel, when faced with questions regarding
an indigent defendant’s entitlement to services other than those from a lawyer,
courts will focus on the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
instead.  The next section will discuss in detail the Court’s due process jurispru-
dence in relation to indigent criminal defendants.
C. The Due Process Clause and Indigent Defendants
Since deciding Gideon in 1963, the Supreme Court has held that, in some
situations, indigent defendants are constitutionally entitled under the Due Pro-
cess Clause to the appointment of certain professionals in addition to attor-
neys.133 In Ake v. Oklahoma, for instance, the Court was presented with the
question of whether a defendant who may have been insane at the time of the
crime was entitled by the Constitution to have access to a psychiatrist in order
to build an effective defense based on his mental condition.134 The defendant,
Glen Burton Ake, was charged with murdering a couple and wounding their
two children.135 Ake’s behavior at his arraignment was bizarre to the extent
that the trial judge ordered a psychiatric evaluation to help the court decide
127 Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 371–72 (1986).
128 ISRAEL & LAFAVE, supra note 32, at 401.
129 Kimmelman, 477 U.S. at 369.
130 Id. at 384 (emphasis in original).
131 Id. at 385.
Respondent’s lawyer neither investigated, nor made a reasonable decision not to investigate, the
State’s case through discovery. Such a complete lack of pretrial preparation puts at risk both the
defendant’s right to an ample opportunity to meet the case of the prosecution, and the reliability
of the adversarial testing process.
Id. (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
132 Id. at 390–91.
133 See generally Fred Warren Bennett, Toward Eliminating Bargain Basement Justice:
Providing Indigent Defendants with Expert Services and an Adequate Defense, 58 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 95 (1995).
134 Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 70 (1985). For another in-depth analysis of the Ake
decision, see Carlton Bailey, Ake v. Oklahoma and an Indigent Defendant’s ‘Right’ to an
Expert Witness: A Promise Denied or Imagined?, 10 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 401 (2002).
135 Ake, 470 U.S. at 70.
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whether further observation would be necessary to determine Ake’s mental sta-
bility.136 The examining psychiatrist concluded that Ake probably suffered
from paranoid schizophrenia and recommended that the court order further psy-
chiatric evaluations before determining Ake’s competency to stand trial.137
Based on this report, Ake was sent to a state mental hospital for examina-
tion and determination of his competency.138 After several months of observa-
tion, the hospital’s chief forensic psychiatrist determined that Ake was
incompetent and should not be tried.139 Accordingly, the court declared Ake
incompetent and committed him to a mental hospital.140 Six weeks after he was
committed, the hospital’s chief forensic psychiatrist informed the court that
Ake had become competent to stand trial.141 The psychiatrist opined that if Ake
continued to receive the antipsychotic drug that he was taking at the hospital,
his condition would remain stable.142
At a pretrial conference held after the criminal proceedings against Ake
resumed, Ake’s attorney informed the court that Ake intended to raise an
insanity defense, and that Ake would need a psychiatrist to determine his
mental condition at the time he committed the offense.143 The attorney also
informed the court that Ake could not afford to pay for a psychiatrist and
requested that the court either appoint a psychiatrist or provide funds so Ake
could hire one.144 The court denied counsel’s request, rejecting the argument
that the Constitution requires access to a psychiatrist when such access is nec-
essary to build an insanity defense.145
At trial, neither side presented expert testimony regarding Ake’s mental
state at the time of the offense.146 The jury ultimately rejected Ake’s insanity
defense and returned a guilty verdict.147 Ake was sentenced to death based, at
least in part, on testimony presented by the prosecution regarding his future
dangerousness.148 The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals rejected Ake’s
argument that he was constitutionally entitled to a court-appointed psychiatrist,
and affirmed Ake’s conviction and sentence.149 The United States Supreme
Court granted certiorari.150
The Supreme Court reversed the state court and concluded that Ake was
constitutionally entitled, under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, to the assistance of a psychiatrist both on the issue of his sanity at
the time of the crime and on the issue of future dangerousness.151 The Court
136 Id. at 71.
137 Id.
138 Id.
139 Id.
140 Id.
141 Id.
142 Id. at 71–72.
143 Id. at 72.
144 Id.
145 Id.
146 Id.
147 Id. at 73.
148 Id.
149 Id. at 73–74.
150 Id. at 74.
151 Id. at 86–87.
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began its discussion by noting “that when a State brings its judicial power to
bear on an indigent defendant in a criminal proceeding, it must take steps to
assure that the defendant has a fair opportunity to present his defense.”152 The
Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment’s protection of fundamental fairness
requires that an indigent defendant not be “denied the opportunity to participate
meaningfully in a judicial proceeding in which his liberty is at stake.”153
In support of its decision, the Court in Ake cited several prior cases that
outlined other rights afforded indigent defendants. It noted, for instance, that
pursuant to Griffin v. Illinois,154 a criminal defendant must be provided with a
trial transcript “if the transcript is necessary to a decision on the merits of the
appeal.”155 It also cited Burns v. Ohio,156 where the Court held against requir-
ing indigent defendants to pay a fee before filing an appeal;157 Gideon v. Wain-
wright, where the Court held that an indigent defendant is entitled to the
assistance of counsel at trial;158 and Douglas v. California,159 where the Court
held that an indigent defendant is entitled to the assistance of counsel on his
first direct appeal as of right.160
The Court went on to hold that:
[W]hile the Court has not held that a State must purchase for the indigent defendant
all the assistance that his wealthier counterpart might buy, it has often reaffirmed that
fundamental fairness entitles indigent defendants to ‘an adequate opportunity to pre-
sent their claims fairly within the adversary system.’ . . . To implement this principle,
we have focused on identifying the ‘basic tools of an adequate defense or appeal’ . . .
and we have required that such tools be provided to those defendants who cannot
afford to pay for them.161
The Court in Ake then turned to the question of “whether, and under what
conditions, the participation of a psychiatrist is important enough to preparation
of a defense to require the State to provide an indigent defendant with access to
competent psychiatric assistance in preparing the defense.”162 The Court
focused on three relevant factors: the private interest; the governmental interest;
and the likely value of the safeguard sought and the risk of error if that safe-
guard is not provided.163
The Court characterized the private interest as the “interest in the accuracy
of a criminal proceeding that places an individual’s life or liberty at risk,” and
152 Id. at 76.
153 Id.
154 Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
155 Ake, 470 U.S. at 76.
156 Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252 (1959).
157 Ake, 470 U.S. at 76.
158 Id.
159 Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
160 Ake, 470 U.S. at 76.
161 Id. at 77 (citations omitted). Furthermore:
We recognized long ago that mere access to the courthouse doors does not by itself assure a
proper functioning of the adversary process, and that a criminal trial is fundamentally unfair if
the State proceeds against an indigent defendant without making certain that he has access to the
raw materials integral to the building of an effective defense.
Id.
162 Id.
163 Id.
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called this interest “uniquely compelling.”164 The Court rejected the state’s
argument that providing Ake with psychiatric assistance would result “in a
staggering burden.”165 It noted that many other courts provided psychiatric
assistance to indigent defendants without incurring a substantial financial bur-
den.166 Moreover, the Court could not identify any governmental interest that
weighed against recognition of this right.167 As to the value of the psychiatric
assistance and the possible harm of failing to offer the service, the Court con-
cluded that without a psychiatrist’s assistance in building an insanity defense,
“the risk of an inaccurate resolution of sanity issues is extremely high,”
whereas if the defendant were to have access to a psychiatrist, he would be able
to fairly and meaningfully present his case.168
Based on its evaluation of these three factors, the Court held that where a
defendant’s sanity at the time he committed the offense is significant to the
criminal proceeding, the court is required to provide the defendant with access
to a competent psychiatrist.169 The Court further held that where the defen-
dant’s future dangerousness is raised as a sentencing issue, “due process
requires access to a psychiatric examination on relevant issues, to the testimony
of the psychiatrist, and to assistance in preparation at the sentencing phase.”170
Dissenting, Justice Rehnquist expressed his opinion that the majority’s rule was
“far too broad.”171 Rehnquist opined that the rule should be limited to capital
cases, and that it should be made clear that a psychiatrist is only to help with an
independent psychiatric evaluation, rather than to function as a defense
consultant.172
In Caldwell v. Mississippi,173 the Supreme Court “held open the possibil-
ity of extending the Ake analysis to other types of experts (e.g., forensic spe-
cialists), given a proper showing of need.”174 The defendant in Caldwell, who
was convicted of murder and sentenced to death, challenged his conviction
based in part upon the trial court’s refusal to provide experts to assist the defen-
dant in preparing his case.175 The Supreme Court affirmed Caldwell’s convic-
tion, holding that Caldwell had not shown that these experts were necessary to
help him prepare his defense.176 The Court concluded, however, by leaving
164 Id. at 78.
165 Id.
166 Id.
167 Id. at 79.
168 Id. at 82.
169 Id. at 83.
170 Id. at 84.
171 Id. at 87 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
172 Id.
173 Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320 (1985).
174 ISRAEL & LAFAVE, supra note 32, at 360.
175 Caldwell, 472 U.S. at 323–24 n.1. Although the trial court was required by state law to,
and did, provide a psychiatrist, it rejected Caldwell’s requests for a fingerprint expert, a
criminal investigator, and a ballistics expert. Id.
176 Id. The Court noted, as an example, that in support of his request for a ballistics expert,
Caldwell “included little more than the general statement that the requested expert would be
of great necessarius witness.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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open the possibility that denial of such assistance might amount to a due pro-
cess violation if more of a showing of necessity was made.177
Several courts of appeals have applied the Ake and Caldwell analyses to
specific cases. In Moore v. Kemp, for example, the Eleventh Circuit Court of
Appeals interpreted Ake and Caldwell as standing for the proposition that there
is no guarantee that indigent defendants will receive every expert they demand;
instead, a defendant must show “a reasonable probability both that an expert
would be of assistance to the defense and that denial of expert assistance would
result in a fundamentally unfair trial.”178 In Little v. Armontrout, the Eighth
Circuit Court of Appeals held that due process was violated when the court
refused to appoint a hypnosis expert for a defendant in a rape trial where the
only issue was identification, and the prosecution’s eyewitness was hypnotized
to improve his memory.179 The Eighth Circuit determined that Ake should be
applied even when the defendant did not face the death penalty and the
requested expert was not a psychiatrist.180 The court felt that need should be
determined based on the importance of the scientific issue and the amount of
help an expert could provide, regardless of whether or not the expert was a
psychiatrist or whether or not the case was a capital one.181
Based on the legal principles set forth in Ake, Caldwell, Moore, and Lit-
tle,182 the appointment of an immigration attorney for an indigent noncitizen
177 Id. “We therefore have no need to determine as a matter of federal constitutional law
what if any showing would have entitled a defendant to assistance of the type here sought.”
Id.
178 Moore v. Kemp, 809 F.2d 702, 712 (11th Cir. 1987) (footnote omitted).
179 Little v. Armontrout, 835 F.2d 1240, 1241–42 (8th Cir. 1987). The court in Little con-
cluded that “the denial of a state-provided expert on hypnosis to assist this indigent defen-
dant rendered the trial fundamentally unfair and require[d] that the conviction be set aside.”
Id. at 1243.
180 Id.
181 Id.
There is no principled way to distinguish between psychiatric and nonpsychiatric experts. The
question in each case must be not what field of science or expert knowledge is involved, but
rather how important the scientific issue is in the case, and how much help a defense expert
could have given. Nor do we draw a decisive line for due-process purposes between capital and
noncapital cases. To be sure, the defendant’s interest in staying alive is greater and different in
kind from his interest in avoiding a prison term, but the latter interest, in our opinion, still
outweighs the state’s interest in avoiding the relatively small expenditure that would be required.
Id. at 1243–44.
182 See also Ex parte Moody, 684 So. 2d 114, 119 (Ala. 1996) (“[A]n indigent defendant
. . . [is] entitled to expert assistance at public expense . . . [if he shows] a reasonable
probability that the expert would be of assistance in the defense and that the denial of expert
assistance would result in a fundamentally unfair trial.”); People v. San Nicolas, 101 P.3d
509, 542 (Cal. 2004) (“A criminal defendant has the due process right to the assistance of
expert witnesses . . . if necessary, to prepare his defense.”); Weis v. State, 694 S.E.2d 350,
361 (Ga. 2010) (“It is beyond question that the State is required to provide appointed counsel
and expert assistance to indigent criminal defendants.”); State v. Davis, 318 S.W.3d 618, 632
(Mo. 2010) (“[W]here the required showing of significance and necessity is made, Ake’s
rationale may extend to non-psychiatric experts in the appropriate case.”); State v. Wolf, No.
91-L-096, 1992 Ohio App. LEXIS 6185, at *12–13 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 11, 1992) (holding
that trial court’s refusal to appoint expert pathologist in murder case required reversal of
defendant’s conviction); David Medine, The Constitutional Right to Expert Assistance for
Indigents in Civil Cases, 41 HASTINGS L.J. 281 (1990) (arguing that due process requires
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criminal defendant might be required not only by the Sixth Amendment, but by
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as well.
III. PADILLA—THE SIXTH AMENDMENT AND NONCITIZEN DEFENDANTS
In Padilla, the Supreme Court, in an opinion authored by Justice Stevens
and joined by Justices Kennedy, Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor, concluded
that the Sixth Amendment requires counsel to advise a noncitizen of the possi-
bility of deportation in order for the representation to be constitutionally com-
petent.183 In support of its holding, the Court cited the Second Circuit’s holding
“that the Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel applies to a
JRAD request184 or lack thereof.”185 The Second Circuit held that, far from
being a collateral matter, “the impact of a conviction on a noncitizen’s ability to
remain in the country was a central issue to be resolved during the sentencing
process.”186
The Padilla Court stated that recent changes in immigration law—mainly
the elimination of a judge’s discretion to allow an otherwise deportable alien to
stay in the country187—“dramatically raised the stakes of a noncitizen’s crimi-
nal conviction.”188 The Court noted:
The importance of accurate legal advice for noncitizens accused of crimes has never
been more important. These changes confirm our view that, as a matter of federal
law, deportation is an integral part—indeed, sometimes the most important part—of
appointment of experts to indigent civil litigations); Justin B. Shane, Money Talks: An Indi-
gent Defendant’s Right to an Ex Parte Hearing for Expert Funding, 17 CAP. DEF. J. 347
(2005) (arguing that due process entitles indigent defendants to apply ex parte for expert
funding); A. Michelle Willis, Comment, Nonpsychiatric Expert Assistance and the Requisite
Showing of Need: A Catch-22 in the Post-Ake Criminal Justice System, 37 EMORY L.J. 995
(1988) (discussing due process concerns generally); Jay A. Zollinger, Comment, Defense
Access to State-Funded DNA Experts: Considerations of Due Process, 85 CALIF. L. REV.
1803 (1997) (discussing criminal defendant’s right to state-funded DNA Experts).
183 Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1478 (2010).
184
“JRAD” stands for a “judicial recommendation against deportation.” Id. at 1479. The
JRAD procedure, which was first created by the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1917,
permitted the sentencing judge in both state and federal prosecutions to make a recommen-
dation that an alien convicted of an otherwise deportable offense should not be deported. Id.
The JRAD procedure “was ‘consistently . . . interpreted as giving the sentencing judge con-
clusive authority to decide whether a particular conviction should be disregarded as a basis
for deportation.’” Id. (quoting Janvier v. United States, 793 F.2d 449 (2d Cir. 1986)). The
effect of the JRAD procedure was that there was no such thing as “an automatically deport-
able offense.” Id. As the Court noted in Padilla, however, the JRAD procedure was elimi-
nated by Congress in 1990. Id. at 1480. Under the current state of the law, “if a noncitizen
has committed a removable offense . . . his removal is practically inevitable but for the
possible exercise of limited remnants of equitable discretion vested in the Attorney General
to cancel removal for noncitizens convicted of particular classes of offenses.” Id. As noted
by the Padilla Court “[s]ubject to limited exceptions, this discretionary relief is not available
for an offense related to trafficking in a controlled substance.” Id. For a more detailed expla-
nation of the state of immigration law as it relates to criminal convictions, see infra notes
235–45 and accompanying text.
185 Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1480.
186 Id.
187 See supra note 184.
188 Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1480.
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the penalty that may be imposed on noncitizen defendants who plead guilty to speci-
fied crimes.189
The Court in Padilla held that deportation was so closely connected to the
criminal process that it could not properly be characterized as a direct or collat-
eral consequence, and therefore, that the distinction was not applicable in this
context.190
Moving to the question of whether Padilla’s counsel was ineffective under
the standard set forth in Strickland, the Court found:
When the law is not succinct and straightforward . . . a criminal defense attorney
need do no more than advise a noncitizen client that pending criminal charges may
carry a risk of adverse immigration consequences. But when the deportation conse-
quence is truly clear, as it was in this case, the duty to give correct advice is equally
clear.191
The Court concluded that Padilla met the first prong of Strickland,192 but
it did not decide whether Padilla satisfied Strickland’s second prong by show-
ing prejudice.193 It left that question to the Kentucky courts.194
Concurring in the judgment, Justice Alito, joined by Chief Justice Roberts,
took a more narrow view of what is required by Strickland in this context. In
Justice Alito’s view, Strickland requires an attorney to “(1) refrain from unrea-
sonably providing incorrect advice and (2) advise the defendant that a criminal
conviction may have adverse immigration consequences and that, if the alien
wants advice on this issue, the alien should consult an immigration attor-
ney.”195 Justice Alito disagreed that an attorney must attempt to explain poten-
tial immigration consequences and criticized the majority’s holding “that a
criminal defense attorney must provide advice in this specialized area in those
cases in which the law is ‘sufficient and straightforward’—but not, perhaps, in
other situations.”196
Justice Scalia, in a dissenting opinion joined by Justice Thomas, stated
that the Sixth Amendment does not guarantee “sound advice about the collat-
eral consequences of conviction,” nor require “counsel to provide accurate
advice concerning the potential removal consequences of a guilty plea.”197 Jus-
tice Scalia stated that even “affirmative misadvice about those consequences”
189 Id.
190 Id. at 1482.
191 Id. The Court based this finding on the fact that:
Immigration law can be complex, and it is a legal specialty of its own. Some members of the bar
who represent clients facing criminal charges, in either state or federal court or both, may not be
well versed in it. There will, therefore, undoubtedly be numerous situations in which the deporta-
tion consequences of a particular plea are unclear or uncertain. The duty of the private practi-
tioner in such cases is more limited.
Id. Additionally, the Court noted that Padilla’s case was “not a hard case in which to find
deficiency: The consequences of Padilla’s plea could easily be determined from reading the
removal statute, his deportation was presumptively mandatory, and his counsel’s advice was
incorrect.” Id. at 1483.
192 Id.
193 Id. at 1483–84.
194 Id.
195 Id. at 1487 (Alito, J., concurring).
196 Id.
197 Id. at 1494 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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does not render the assistance of counsel constitutionally infirm.198 According
to Justice Scalia, statutory provisions could better remedy the concerns raised
by the majority.199
After Padilla, it is clear that the Sixth Amendment requires counsel in a
criminal case to “inform her client whether his plea carries a risk of deporta-
tion.”200 Padilla requires counsel to advise the client of the deportation conse-
quences of a guilty plea or conviction when those consequences are clear,
succinct, and straightforward.201  Where the deportation consequences are not
so clear or straightforward, however, counsel need only advise the client of the
possibility of immigration consequences.202  What is not clear is whether the
Constitution requires the appointment of a separate immigration attorney, in
addition to a criminal defense attorney, for an indigent noncitizen defendant in
cases where the deportation consequences are not clear or straightforward.  The
remainder of this Article will discuss when and whether such an appointment is
constitutionally mandated in light of the Supreme Court’s Sixth Amendment
and Due Process precedents.  It will also discuss whether such an appointment
is required by federal statutory law.
IV. ANALYSIS
A. The Current State of Immigration Law & Criminal Convictions
Before discussing whether the Constitution or federal law requires the
appointment of an immigration attorney for indigent noncitizen criminal
defendants facing possible deportation, it is important to understand the current
state of immigration law as it relates to criminal convictions. Under the federal
Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), aliens convicted203 of certain crimes
are subject to removal from the United States.204 The list includes convictions
for crimes of “moral turpitude committed within five years . . . after the date of
admission,” convictions for “two or more crimes involving moral turpitude, not
arising out of a single scheme of criminal misconduct,” any conviction for “an
aggravated felony,” a conviction for high speed flight from an immigration
checkpoint, and a conviction for failing to register as a sex offender.205 An
alien is also subject to removal if convicted of a “violation of (or a conspiracy
or attempt to violate) any law or regulation of a State, the United States, or a
foreign country relating to a controlled substance . . . other than a single offense
involving possession for one’s own use of 30 grams or less of marijuana,”206 or
a firearm offense.207 Other deportable offenses under the INA include espio-
198 Id. at 1494–95.
199 Id. at 1495.
200 Id. at 1486.
201 Id. at 1483.
202 Id.
203 The word “convicted,” as used in the INA, includes a formal judgment of guilt, a plea of
guilty, and a plea of nolo contendere. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(48)(A)(i)–(ii) (2006).
204 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2) (2006 & Supp. II 2008).
205 Id. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i)–(v).
206 Id. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i).
207 Id. § 1227(a)(2)(C).
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nage, sabotage, treason, and sedition; threats against the President or Vice-Pres-
ident; engaging in an expedition against a friendly nation; violating the
Selective Service Act or the Trading With the Enemy Act;208 crimes of domes-
tic violence, stalking, violation of a protective order or crimes against chil-
dren;209 and trafficking of aliens.210
As the Supreme Court in Padilla noted, “Under contemporary law, if a
noncitizen has committed a removable offense . . . his removal is practically
inevitable.”211 The only exception to this inevitable removal is that the Attor-
ney General may cancel removal if the alien has (1) been lawfully admitted as a
permanent citizen for at least five years, (2) has lived continuously in the
United States for at least seven years after being admitted, and (3) has never
been convicted of an aggravated felony.212
Because of the current state of immigration law, criminal convictions of
noncitizens may have severe repercussions. The increased stakes of a criminal
conviction for an alien were discussed in more detail by the Asian American
Justice Center and the Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund
in their amicus brief to the Supreme Court in the Padilla case. In their brief,
these organizations noted that “the 1996 amendments to the INA rendered the
immigration consequences of convictions for many crimes more certain, imme-
diate, and severe.”213 The amicus brief went on to note that “[u]nder the
amended law, convictions for many relatively minor state-law crimes that pre-
viously were not deportable offenses—or were offenses that carried immigra-
tion consequences from which courts had discretion to grant relief on a case-
by-case basis—now result in mandatory detention and deportation.”214 Accord-
ing to the amici, uninformed noncitizens are at risk of entering into a plea with
unintended immigration consequences.215
208 Id. § 1227(a)(2)(D)(i)–(iii).
209 Id. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i)–(ii).
210 Id. § 1227(a)(2)(F).
211 Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1480 (2010).
212 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a)(1)–(3) (2006).
213 Brief for Amici Curiae Asian Am. Justice Ctr. et al. in Support of Petitioner at 6, Padilla
v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010) (No. 08-651).
214 Id.
215 Id. The amici brief also discusses the difficulty that a noncitizen criminal defendant
would have in attempting to determine the immigration consequences of his plea or convic-
tion without competent counsel to advise him of those consequences:
Because the INA’s reach is exceedingly broad, non-citizens may plead guilty to minor crimes in
exchange for a lighter sentence without realizing that they are pleading guilty to crimes that will
subject them to mandatory deportation . . . . Whether immigration law classifies a particular
criminal conviction as one that results in detention or deportation, however, can turn largely on
the specifics of a non-citizen’s plea agreement. . . . Therefore, because the immigration conse-
quences of pleading guilty can be so severe—and because the specifics of the plea agreement are
so important—it is crucial that non-citizens be fully aware of those relevant considerations
before accepting a plea.
Id. at 11. The brief goes on to argue that “[d]eportation and detention, which are often
consequences of criminal convictions for non-citizens, can severely disrupt settled expecta-
tions, wreak havoc on an individual’s life, and tear families apart.” Id. at 12 (emphasis
omitted). It discusses certain consequences of deportation, such as the separation of families,
the loss of livelihood, and possible deportation back to countries from which the alien fled
persecution. Id.
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The Court in Padilla cited these concerns in support of its holding that an
attorney, in order to comply with the Sixth Amendment, “must inform her cli-
ent whether his plea carries a risk of deportation.”216 The Court, however, also
noted the likelihood that in many cases the immigration consequences would be
unclear.217 In those difficult cases, the Court held, all a criminal defense attor-
ney must do is inform the defendant that the charges against him “may carry a
risk of adverse immigration consequences.”218 Even under Justice Alito’s con-
currence, a criminal defense attorney is required to “advise the defendant that a
criminal conviction may have adverse immigration consequences and that, if
the alien wants advice on this issue, the alien should consult an immigration
attorney.”219
The remainder of this Article will discuss what happens when a noncitizen
criminal defendant cannot afford to consult an immigration attorney. This Arti-
cle will argue that federal statutory law, the Sixth Amendment, and the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment all require that such a defendant
be appointed an immigration attorney in certain circumstances.
B. Statutory Entitlement: The Criminal Justice Act
In addition to the appointment of immigration counsel under the Sixth
Amendment and the Due Process Clause, an indigent noncitizen defendant may
also be entitled to government funding of an immigration attorney under fed-
eral statutory law. The Criminal Justice Act (“CJA”) requires, in federal prose-
cutions, the funding of services other than counsel220 where the court finds
“that the services are necessary and that the person is financially unable to
obtain them.”221 Specifically, the CJA provides that where the defendant is
indigent, counsel for that defendant may request the needed experts or ser-
vices.222 Once such an application is made, the court must hold an ex parte
hearing to confirm both that the requested assistance is necessary223 and that
the defendant cannot afford such assistance.224 After making the appropriate
finding, the court is required to authorize counsel to obtain those services.225
Moreover, where such expert services are necessary for adequate represen-
tation, counsel for an indigent defendant who herself was appointed to
represent the defendant under the CJA, “may obtain, subject to later review,
216 Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1486.
217 Id. at 1483.
218 Id.
219 Id. at 1487 (Alito, J., concurring).
220 Although an immigration attorney is technically “counsel,” such an attorney would be
treated the same as a non-lawyer expert under the CJA.
221 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(e)(1) (2006).
222 Id.
223 The question of whether assistance is “necessary” is determined by courts on a case-by-
case basis. See, e.g., United States v. Theriault, 440 F.2d 713, 715 (5th Cir. 1971) (“The
standards to govern what is ‘necessary to an adequate defense’ are not susceptible to arbi-
trary articulation but can best be developed on a case by case basis.” (quoting Schultz v.
United States, 431 F.2d 907, 913 (8th Cir. 1970) (concurring opinion))).
224 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(e)(1).
225 Id.
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investigative, expert, and other services without prior authorization.”226 How-
ever, where there was no prior authorization by the court, “the total cost of
service[ ] . . . may not exceed $800 and expenses reasonably incurred.”227 An
exception to this $800 limit exists where the court finds “that timely procure-
ment of necessary services could not await prior authorization.”228 Upon such a
finding, the court “may, in the interest of justice . . . approve payment for such
services after they have been obtained, even if the cost of such services exceeds
$800.”229 The CJA also places a cap of $2,400 on the provision of such ser-
vices “unless payment in excess of that limit is certified by the court . . . as
necessary to provide fair compensation for services of an unusual character or
duration, and the amount of the excess payment is approved by the chief judge
of the circuit.”230
The above-referenced provisions of the CJA would apply to a request for
immigration counsel where the defendant’s criminal attorney could establish
that such assistance is necessary and that the defendant is not financially able to
obtain such assistance. At least one court has interpreted the CJA as possibly
requiring funding for the services of an immigration attorney in certain circum-
stances. In that case, United States v. Alves, the defendant was charged with
transferring counterfeit social security cards and alien registration cards in vio-
lation of federal law.231  Because he was indigent, the court appointed counsel
to represent him under the CJA.232 Through his appointed criminal attorney,
the defendant requested the additional help of an immigration attorney.233 The
criminal attorney filed a motion arguing that he was not knowledgeable in
immigration law and that the immigration consequences were crucial to deter-
mining how to proceed with the case.234
The attorney did not cite the CJA directly, but instead cited Section 2.11
of the Guide to Judicial Policies and Procedures. However, the district court
expressly recognized the provision of the CJA allowing for ex parte applica-
tions for expert services,235 and held that the standard under Section 2.11 was
essentially the same as that required by the CJA.236 Therefore, the court’s hold-
ing regarding availability of funds under the Guide to Judicial Policies and
Procedures would apply with equal force to an application for prior approval of
expert funding under the CJA.237
In deciding whether to grant the defendant’s request for the appointment
of an immigration attorney under Paragraph 2.11(B),238 the district court first
226 Id. § 3006A(e)(2)(A).
227 Id.
228 Id. § 3006A(e)(2)(B).
229 Id.
230 Id. § 3006A(e)(3). This provision goes on to provide that “[t]he chief judge of the circuit
may delegate such approval authority to an active or senior circuit judge.” Id.
231 United States v. Alves, 317 F. Supp. 2d 65, 66 (D. Mass. 2004).
232 Id.
233 Id.
234 Id.
235 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(e)(1).
236 Alves, 317 F. Supp. 2d at 67 n.2.
237 Id.
238 In 2004, Paragraph 2.11.B of the Guide provided:
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noted that “a prerequisite for obtaining the appointment of an additional attor-
ney is that the case be ‘extremely difficult.’”239 The court held that this
requirement was necessary to prevent routine requests from appearing in every
case where the defendant may face immigration consequences, which would
inevitably severely strain the courts’ resources.240 The court concluded that,
because the defendant in the case before it wanted an immigration attorney to
help research the case and provide advice on immigration matters generally
instead of seeking to have the immigration attorney actually represent him, Part
B did not allow for such an appointment.241
The court went on to discuss Part A of Paragraph 2.11, which provided:
Unless appointed in accordance with paragraph[ ] 2.11 B . . . co-counsel or associate
attorneys may not be compensated under the [CJA]. However, an appointed counsel
may claim compensation for services furnished by a partner or associate or, with
prior authorization by the court, counsel who is not a partner or associate, within the
maximum compensation allowed by the [CJA], separately identifying the provider of
each service.242
Because the attorney did not move for prior authorization for funding
under Paragraph 2.11(A), but instead moved for appointment of an immigration
attorney under Part B, the court did not decide whether the defendant would be
entitled to prior authorization under Part A.243 However, the court did discuss
what the defendant must show to obtain such prior approval: namely, that the
defendant’s otherwise competent CJA counsel cannot, through research, dis-
cover the immigration consequences under the circumstances.244
As illustrated by the district court’s decision in Alves, even if the appoint-
ment of immigration counsel is not constitutionally required, an indigent nonci-
In an extremely difficult case where the court finds it in the interest of justice to appoint an
additional attorney, each attorney is eligible to receive the maximum compensation allowable
under the [CJA]. The finding of the court that the appointment of an additional attorney in a
difficult case was necessary and in the interest of justice shall appear on the Order of
Appointment.
7 GUIDE TO JUDICIAL POLICIES & PROCEDURES ¶ 2.11.B [hereinafter GUIDE TO JUDICIAL
POLICIES]. The Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, which creates the guide, rede-
signed the guide in 2010. The new format for volume 7 of the guide can be found at http://
www.uscourts.gov/FederalCourts/AppointmentOfCounsel/Viewer.aspx?doc=/uscourts/Fed-
eralCourts/AppointmentOfCounsel/vol7/Vol_07.pdf. There is a link that shows how the old
paragraph structure transferred into the new section formatting.
239 Alves, 317 F. Supp. 2d at 67.
240 Id. at 67 n.1.
241 Id. at 67.
242 GUIDE TO JUDICIAL POLICIES, supra note 238, at ¶ 2.11.A.
243 Alves, 317 F. Supp. 2d at 69.
244 [A]n attorney appointed pursuant to the CJA should be granted such authorization only when
there is a specific need which the CJA attorney himself is unable to meet. That is to say, prior
authorization should not be given merely because a defendant is not a citizen and, hence, there
will be immigration consequences upon conviction. CJA counsel, although not a specialist in
immigration law, should be able to do the research necessary to discover those consequences. If,
however, CJA counsel has a defendant where it cannot be discerned, despite CJA counsel’s
diligent research efforts, what effect a conviction will have on the defendant’s immigration sta-
tus, then a case can be made that prior authorization to obtain assistance from an immigration
attorney should be granted.
Id. at 67–68.
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tizen defendant may still be eligible for government funding of such counsel
under the CJA where the defendant’s appointed criminal attorney can show that
such expert assistance is necessary and that the defendant cannot afford it him-
self. The CJA, of course, only applies in federal prosecutions.  However, many
states, as well as the District of Columbia, have similar statutes that give
defendants some right to petition the court for expert assistance.245 In those
states that do not have such a statute, however, an indigent noncitizen defen-
dant will have to rely on the Sixth Amendment and/or the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment to support a claim of entitlement to the assis-
tance of an appointed immigration lawyer.
C. Requiring the Appointment of an Immigration Attorney Under the Sixth
Amendment
In light of the Padilla Court’s acknowledgement that deportation is per-
haps the paramount penalty noncitizens face for specific crimes, and its obser-
vation that immigration law is often too complex for attorneys who do not
specialize in it,246 it would make little sense for the Court to conclude that an
indigent defendant should not be afforded such a specialist to advise him
regarding the possible deportation consequences of his plea or conviction. To
fail to do so, in fact, would likely violate the Sixth Amendment right to counsel
and the competency requirement imposed under Strickland.
By way of example, suppose defendant Juan Pe´rez, who moved to the
United States from Guatemala four years ago and has gained permanent resi-
dency, is charged with indecent exposure. Because this offense occurred within
five years of Pe´rez’s admission to the United States, if it is considered a “crime
of moral turpitude,” he will be removable under the INA.247 Further, because
he has not legally resided in the United States for at least five years, he would
245 Shane, supra note 182, at 356–57; see also Bailey, supra note 134, at 457 n.535 (listing
relevant state statutes). These jurisdictions include, but are not limited to, Alabama (ALA.
CODE § 15-12-21(d) (1995 & Supp. 2011)), Alaska (ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 18.85.100(a)(1)-
(2) (West 2007 & Supp. 2011)), Arizona (ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-4013(B) (2010)),
Arkansas (ARK. CODE ANN. § 14-20-102(a)(1) (West 2004)), California (CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 987.9 (West 2008) (limited to capital and second-degree murder cases)), Colorado (COLO.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-1-403 (West 2004)), Delaware (DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 4603(b)
(West 2006) (permitting public defender to spend money on any necessary assistance)), Dis-
trict of Columbia (D.C. CODE § 11-2605(a) (2001 & Supp. 2011)), Hawaii (HAW. REV.
STAT. § 802-7 (West 2008)), Idaho (IDAHO CODE ANN. § 19-852(a)(2) (West 2006)), Kansas
(KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-4508 (West 1995)), Minnesota (MINN. STAT. ANN. § 611.21(a)
(West 2009)), Nevada (NEV. REV. STAT. § 7.135 (2009)), New Hampshire (N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 604-A:6 (2001 & Supp. 2011)), New Mexico (N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-16-3 (West
2003)), New York (N.Y. COUNTY LAW § 722-c (McKinney 2004)), North Carolina (N.C.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 7A-450(b) (West 2004)), Ohio (OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.024
(West 2006 & Supp. 2011) (limited to aggravated murder cases)), Oklahoma (OKLA. STAT.
tit. 20, § 1304(B)(19) (Supp. 2011)), Oregon (OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §135.055(3) (West 2003
& Supp. 2011)), South Carolina (S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-3-50(B) (1976 & Supp. 2011)), Ten-
nessee (TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-14-207(b) (West 2008 & Supp. 2011) (limited to capital
cases)), Texas (TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 26.05(d) (West 2009 & Supp. 2011)), and
Vermont (VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 5231(a)(2) (West 2007 & Supp. 2011)).
246 Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1480, 1484 (2010).
247 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i)–(ii) (2006).
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be ineligible for cancellation of that removal.248 However, the question of
whether the crime is one of “moral turpitude,” as that term is used in the INA,
is open for interpretation.249 This is because the INA does not define “crime of
moral turpitude,” thus leaving it to trial courts to engage in a case-specific
analysis to determine whether the elements of the crime charged fit into the
generic definition.250
Suppose also that Pe´rez’s court-appointed criminal defense attorney, a
recent law school graduate and local public defender, knows little to nothing
about immigration law, and therefore is unable to tell Pe´rez whether or not he
will be deported if he decides to plead guilty or is otherwise convicted. Pursu-
ant to Padilla, however, the attorney informs Pe´rez of the possibility of immi-
gration consequences and suggests that Pe´rez talk to an immigration lawyer for
more detailed advice. Pe´rez, however, cannot afford to even briefly consult an
immigration attorney, and, therefore, unless the court appoints an immigration
attorney or provides Pe´rez funds to hire one himself, he cannot know for certain
whether his guilty plea would deem him removable under the INA.
Given the importance of the immigration consequences of a criminal con-
viction, which were expressly recognized by the Supreme Court in Padilla, it is
inconsistent with the purpose of the Sixth Amendment’s right to counsel to tell
Pe´rez that he is not entitled to a court-appointed or court-funded immigration
specialist. The Supreme Court has held that “[t]he purpose of the Sixth Amend-
ment counsel guarantee . . . is to ‘protec[t] the unaided layman at critical con-
frontations’ with his ‘expert adversary,’ the government.”251 As mentioned
above, the Court in Strickland held that the Sixth Amendment does not just
guarantee the assistance of counsel, but more specifically guarantees effective
assistance of counsel in all criminal prosecutions.252 If an attorney who focuses
her practice on criminal defense cannot effectively provide representation and
consultation regarding immigration issues, then the Sixth Amendment would
seemingly require the appointment of an immigration specialist in order for the
representation to be effective under the Strickland standard.
If this were not required, it could not be said that an indigent defendant
charged with a crime for which the immigration consequences are difficult to
determine was afforded the “reasonable professional assistance” required under
Strickland.253  Further, without this rule, the holding in Padilla would lose
much of its practical significance because a noncitizen indigent defendant who
is informed by his criminal defense attorney that he should consult an immigra-
tion lawyer for more detailed advice would almost never be able to do so.
Accordingly, such a defendant would be in no better position than he was
before he was informed of the possibility of immigration consequences. There-
fore, if the Court wants to give its holding in Padilla real practical significance,
248 Id. § 1229b(a)(1).
249 See Nunez v. Holder, 594 F.3d 1124, 1138 (9th Cir. 2010) (concluding that indecent
exposure under California law is not a crime involving moral turpitude).
250 See id. at 1129.
251 McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 177 (1991) (quoting United States v. Gouveia, 467
U.S. 180, 189 (1984)).
252 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 685 (1984).
253 Id. at 689.
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it should extend the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee to include the appointment
of immigration counsel to indigent noncitizen defendants.
Promulgating such a rule, moreover, would not mean that every indigent
noncitizen criminal defendant would be entitled to the appointment of an immi-
gration attorney. Instead, the Court could limit this right to noncitizen indigent
defendants who are able to show that (1) they are facing the possibility of
deportation upon conviction and (2) the immigration consequences of their plea
or conviction are beyond the ability of their appointed criminal attorney to
determine.
The Court could borrow such a rule from the due process realm, where
courts have held that some sort of showing of necessity must be made before a
criminal defendant is entitled to the assistance of appointed experts.254 One
way in which a defendant could make such a showing of necessity would be to
present an affidavit from his appointed criminal attorney stating that the defen-
dant is facing potential immigration consequences, but that the exact nature of
those consequences is beyond the scope of that attorney’s expertise. Such a rule
would not require the appointment of immigration counsel in cases where the
court determines that the immigration consequences are so clear and straight-
forward that the appointed criminal defense attorney could effectively advise
the defendant regarding that issue. Where such an appointment is necessary to
ensure the fair administration of justice, however, it would be required.
D. Due Process Considerations
In addition to the CJA and the Sixth Amendment, the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment might also require the appointment of an immi-
gration attorney under certain circumstances. Because the Sixth Amendment
has historically been limited to a defendant’s right to a criminal defense attor-
ney,255 courts might feel more comfortable utilizing the due process frame-
work, which has already been extended to cover a wide variety of appointed
experts.256  Moreover, it would be relatively simple to utilize the rules and
standards already employed by courts in other due process cases.
If the Supreme Court is ever asked to decide whether the Due Process
Clause requires the appointment of immigration counsel, it would likely
employ the three-factor test that it established in Ake to answer that question.257
Under the Ake analysis, the Court would look at (1) the defendant’s interest, (2)
the government’s interest, and (3) the probable value of the safeguard that is
sought, “and the risk of an erroneous deprivation of the affected interest if
th[at] safeguard[ ] [is] not provided.”258 The first factor that the Court would
consider—the defendant’s interest—clearly supports recognizing a due process
254 See, e.g., Moore v. Kemp, 809 F.2d 702, 712 (11th Cir. 1987) (An indigent defendant
“must show the trial court that there exists a reasonable probability both that an expert would
be of assistance to the defense and that denial of expert assistance would result in a funda-
mentally unfair trial.”).
255 Although, as discussed in the previous section, this is not a necessary, or even wise,
limitation.
256 See supra notes 134–183 and accompanying text.
257 Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 77 (1985).
258 Id.
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right to appointed immigration counsel. As already discussed, the Supreme
Court in Padilla expressly found that the immigration consequences of a crimi-
nal conviction are extremely important.259 A noncitizen defendant’s interest in
staying in the United States is just as important, if not more important, than that
defendant’s interest in whether or not he is convicted. As the amici in Padilla
noted in their brief, removal from the United States has numerous severe conse-
quences, such as the separation of families, the loss of livelihood, and a possi-
ble forced return to a persecuting country.260 Accordingly, as was the case in
Ake, a noncitizen defendant has a compelling interest in obtaining accurate and
specific immigration advice.
Application of the second factor—the government’s interest—is less clear.
States would likely argue that imposition of such a requirement would create a
severe financial burden. This argument was rejected in Ake, where the Court
noted that states would not face a “staggering burden” because many states, as
well as the federal government, already made psychiatric assistance available to
indigent defendants and had not suffered such adverse effects.261 The same
cannot be said for the appointment of immigration attorneys for noncitizen
indigent criminal defendants because no state has ever imposed such a require-
ment. However, as was the case in Ake, it is hard to discern any state interest,
beyond the purely economic, that is against recognizing the right to appointed
immigration counsel.262 In light of the government’s strong interest in the fair
administration of justice,263 the Court would likely conclude that the state’s
interest in denying the assistance of immigration counsel “is not substantial.”264
This is especially true because the right to appointed immigration counsel
would not extend to every indigent noncitizen criminal defendant, but would
instead only extend to those defendants who could make a proper showing of
necessity, thereby lessening the financial burden imposed on the
government.265
The third and final Ake factor that the Court would consider is the proba-
ble value of the safeguard and “the risk of error” if the safeguard is not
offered.266 This factor likely also works in favor of recognizing the due process
right to immigration counsel. Just as the Court in Ake looked at “the pivotal
role that psychiatry has come to play in criminal proceedings,”267 the Court
could borrow from its language in Padilla regarding the pivotal role that immi-
gration consequences play when the defendant is a noncitizen.268 Likewise, the
Court could also cite Padilla when discussing the risk of error if the safeguard
259 Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1480 (2010) (finding that immigration conse-
quences are “sometimes the most important part” of the penalty imposed on noncitizen crim-
inal defendants).
260 See supra notes 213–15 and accompanying text.
261 Ake, 470 U.S. at 78.
262 Id. at 78–79
263 See, e.g., Martinez v. Court of Appeal, 528 U.S. 152, 163 (2000) (discussing govern-
ment’s interest in “fair and efficient administration of justice”).
264 Ake, 470 U.S. at 79.
265 See supra note 254 and accompanying text.
266 Ake, 470 U.S. at 79.
267 Id.
268 Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1480 (2010).
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is not offered. As the Court recognized in Padilla, “Immigration law can be
complex,” and “[t]here will, therefore, undoubtedly be numerous situations in
which the deportation consequences of a particular plea are unclear or uncer-
tain.”269 The risk of error if the defendant is not provided access to immigration
counsel in those difficult cases is, therefore, substantial and likely worthy of
protection.270
As with the Sixth Amendment, the right to appointed immigration counsel
under the Due Process Clause would not be unlimited or automatic. Properly
limiting the scope of such a right would lessen the financial burden on the state
and ensure that an immigration attorney is provided free of charge only in cases
where such an appointment is necessary to ensure fairness. It is clear that, pur-
suant to Caldwell v. Mississippi, where a defendant offers “little more than
undeveloped assertions that the requested assistance would be beneficial,” such
assistance is not required in order to comport with due process.271 The Court in
Caldwell, however, did leave open the possibility that a stronger showing of
need would trigger the Due Process Clause.272
One way the Court could limit a noncitizen defendant’s due process right
to appointed immigration counsel would be to follow the standard established
by the Eleventh Circuit in Moore v. Kemp.273 Under that standard, a noncitizen
indigent defendant would be entitled to an appointed immigration lawyer only
if that defendant could show “that there exists a reasonable probability both that
an [immigration lawyer] would be of assistance to the defense and that denial
of [such] assistance would result in a fundamentally unfair trial.”274 As was
discussed in the previous section,275 a defendant could make such a showing by
presenting an affidavit by his criminal attorney stating that the defendant faces
possible immigration consequences, but that the criminal attorney is unable to
advise the defendant regarding the exact nature of those consequences. This test
would ensure that the appointment of an immigration attorney occurs only in
those cases in which such an appointment is necessary to ensure the fair admin-
istration of justice.
Another test that courts could employ in deciding whether a particular
defendant is entitled to appointed immigration counsel is the test utilized by the
Eighth Circuit in Little v. Armontrout.276 In Little, the Eighth Circuit held that
“[t]he question in each case must be not what field of science or expert knowl-
edge is involved, but rather how important the scientific issue is in the case, and
269 Id. at 1483.
270 See Brief for Amici Curiae Asian Am. Justice Ctr. et al. in Support of Petitioner, supra
note 213, at 13 (“Without accurate information about how the INA classifies a particular
crime . . . a non-citizen considering whether to plead guilty to a minor crime in exchange for
a lighter sentence risks accepting a plea deal that has the unintended consequence of deten-
tion and, in many cases, permanent banishment from the United States.”).
271 Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 323 n.1 (1985).
272 See id.
273 Moore v. Kemp, 809 F.2d 702, 712 (11th Cir. 1987).
274 Id. (footnote omitted).
275 See supra Part IV.C.
276 Little v. Armontrout, 835 F.2d 1240, 1243 (8th Cir. 1987). The Court need not, of
course, choose one of these tests over the other. Instead, the Court could craft its own test
combining certain elements of both.
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how much help a defense expert could have given.”277 In holding that the
immigration consequences of a plea or conviction are extremely important in
Padilla,278 the Supreme Court has already resolved the first part of the Little
test—the importance of the issue involved. Therefore, all a court would need to
do on a case-by-case basis in deciding whether to appoint an immigration spe-
cialist, is to determine how much help such a specialist could give in that spe-
cific case.279 In those cases where the immigration consequences of a plea or
conviction are obvious and readily apparent to even a non-immigration attor-
ney, a court could refuse to appoint an immigration attorney because, in such a
case, an immigration attorney would not contribute anything significant to the
defense. On the other hand, where the deportation consequences are unclear, a
court could find that an immigration specialist would contribute significantly to
the defense, and, therefore, make such an appointment.280
V. CONCLUSION
In Padilla, the Supreme Court recognized the pivotal role that the immi-
gration consequences of a plea or conviction play when an individual facing
criminal charges is a noncitizen. Those immigration consequences are perhaps
the most important part of the penalty that can be imposed on a noncitizen
criminal defendant. In light of these concerns, the Court in Padilla concluded
that, pursuant to the Sixth Amendment, counsel in a criminal case must advise
her client of the deportation consequences of a plea or conviction where those
consequences are clear, succinct, and straightforward. Where those conse-
quences are not so clear or straightforward, however, the attorney must simply
advise the client of the possibility of immigration consequences. The Padilla
Court predicted that the latter situation would occur often, due to the complex-
ity of immigration law, even for lawyers who do not specialize in immigration.
The Padilla Court’s acknowledgement of the importance of the immigra-
tion consequences of a plea or conviction, combined with its recognition that
immigration law is complex and often not accessible to lawyers who do not
specialize in it, would mean very little if an indigent noncitizen defendant
whose criminal lawyer was not qualified to give immigration advice was not
provided with an appointed immigration attorney, or, at the very least, with
funding to hire one himself.
Not only is such an appointment required under federal statutory law when
a proper showing of necessity is made, but it is also likely required by the Sixth
Amendment itself, as well as the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. This is because an indigent noncitizen defendant who is denied such
expert assistance cannot be said to have enjoyed the effective assistance of
counsel or a fundamentally fair criminal proceeding.
277 Id.
278 Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1480 (2010).
279 Little, 835 F.2d at 1243.
280 A court could also follow the standard that has been employed by courts in the context
of the CJA. For a detailed discussion of this standard, see supra notes 235–44 and accompa-
nying text.
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Moreover, the Court could limit such a right to situations where the nonci-
tizen defendant establishes his financial need, and where the defendant’s
appointed criminal attorney affirms to the court that she cannot accurately
advise the defendant regarding the immigration consequences of his plea or
conviction. This would balance the defendant’s important constitutional rights
with the state’s interest in judicial economy, and prevent entitlement to an
immigration specialist from becoming routine or automatic.
